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Abstract
The adoption of a Taylor-type monetary policy rule and an inflation target for
emerging market economies that choose a flexible exchange rate regime is often
advocated. This paper investigates the issue of exchange rate determination when
interest-rate feedback rules are implemented in a continuous-time optimizing model
of a small open economy facing an imperfect global capital market. It is demon-
strated that when a risk premium on external debt affects the monetary policy
transmission mechanism, the Taylor principle is not a necessary condition for deter-
minacy of equilibrium. On the other hand, it is shown that exchange rate dynamics
critically depends on whether monetary policy is active or passive. In terms of
optimal monetary policy, it is demonstrated that the degree of responsiveness of
the nominal interest rate to inflation should be related to the stock of foreign debt.
Specifically, it is optimal to implement a more passive monetary policy stance in
response to larger levels of the outstanding foreign-currency-denominated debt.
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1 Introduction
Modern research on monetary policy provides strong theoretical foundations for the use
of simple interest-rate feedback rules, that specify the setting of the nominal interest
rate as a function of endogenous variables, such as inflation and output. The standard
literature emphasizes the stabilizing role of ‘active’ interest rate rules, that respond to
increases in inflation with a more than one-to-one increase in the nominal interest rate
(e.g., Taylor, 1999; King, 2000; Woodford 2003; McCallum, 2003; Gal´ı, 2008). These
policy rules a` la Taylor (1993) have originally been designed for developed economies. An
important related issue that has attracted growing attention in the recent policy debate
is the design of monetary policy in emerging market and developing economies. The
occurrence of exchange rate crises in emerging economies during the 1990s has warned
against the adoption of ‘soft’ peg exchange rate regimes, as pointed out by Fischer (2001).
In particular, Taylor (2001) argues that ‘for those emerging market economies that do not
choose a policy of a ‘permanently’ fixed exchange rate (perhaps through a currency board
or a common currency (dollarization)), then the only sound monetary policy is one based
on the trinity of a flexible exchange rate, an inflation target, and a monetary policy rule’.
This paper presents an investigation of the dynamic effects of interest-rate feedback
policies of Taylor’s style within a small open economy facing an imperfect world capital
market. Specifically, the analysis is derived in a continuous-time optimizing general equi-
librium framework with flexible exchange rates and an upward-sloping supply curve of
foreign debt. Our model is an extension of the continuous-time closed-economy monetary
framework employed by Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2001) to an open-economy
environment. A discrete-time theoretical setup would not alter the results of our analy-
sis, but would complicate the analysis due the issue concerning the timing convention in
the definition of the stock variables and of real money balances (see, e.g., Carlstrom and
Fuerst, 2001). Our focus on the implications of financial externalities, associated with the
upward-sloping supply schedule of external debt, is motivated by the fact that emerging
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market and developing countries are subject to credit risk, which constrains their borrow-
ing opportunities. The existence of a risk premium on foreign indebtedness in emerging
market and developing economies constitutes a fairly well-established stylized fact (e.g.,
Age´nor and Montiel, 1999; Montiel 2003).
The model considered in this paper is used to examine three relevant issues in mon-
etary theory. First, we investigate dynamic stability to evaluate whether uniqueness of
equilibrium requires that the central bank reacts to inflation with a more than propor-
tional increase in the nominal interest rate (the so-called ‘Taylor principle’), as predicted
by the standard theory on Taylor rules (e.g., Woodford 2003). Second, we reconsider the
issue of exchange rate dynamics in response to exogenous changes in the domestic nominal
interest rate, government spending, the level of productivity, the subjective discount rate,
the foreign nominal interest rate, and the foreign inflation rate. Third, we explore the
properties of the welfare-maximizing interest rate rules and derive the implications for
the optimal policy.
We demonstrate that when a risk premium on external debt affects the monetary
policy transmission mechanism, the Taylor principle is not a necessary condition for de-
terminacy of equilibrium. That is, ‘passive’ interest rate policies, that underreact to
inflation by increasing the nominal interest rate by less than a raise in domestic inflation,
are compatible with saddle-path stability. The economic intuition for this result can be
explained as follows.
Consider first a standard closed-economy framework, with either flexible or sticky
prices. In such a setup, the destabilizing effect of passive monetary policies has the fol-
lowing rationale. If consumers expect a high level of inflation and monetary policy is
passive, the real interest rate declines. As a result of the Euler equation, characterizing
the consumption-saving optimal decision, households reduce savings and increase con-
sumption. The associated increase in aggregate demand causes prices to increase, hence
validating the initial inflation expectations. As a consequence, passive monetary policies
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generate indeterminacy of equilibrium. Monetary policies in the respect of the Taylor
principle are necessary to induce a unique stable equilibrium.
Consider now what occurs in a small-open-economy framework in which the transmis-
sion mechanism of monetary policy is crucially affected by a risk premium on external
debt. When monetary policy is passive, an upward perturbation in inflation causes the
real interest rate to decrease and private consumption to increase, analogously to the
closed-economy case. However, the increase in consumption tends to stimulate foreign
debt accumulation over time, hence leading to an increase in the country-specific risk
premium. This makes the interest rate on foreign debt rise. Ceteris paribus, international
parity conditions precluding arbitrage opportunities require an increase in the domestic
real interest rate, which reduces aggregate demand and inflation. As a result, active
monetary policies are not necessary to guarantee macroeconomic stability.
Despite the fact that saddle-path stability does not require an aggressive interest rate
policy, the study of transitional dynamics we perform demonstrates that exchange rate
adjustment in response to exogenous disturbances depends in a critical way on whether
monetary policy is active or passive. An increase in external debt brings about an increase
in the country-specific risk premium and hence in the nominal interest rate facing the small
open economy. As a consequence, the risk-adjusted interest rate parity condition requires
an increase in the domestic nominal interest rate net of domestic currency depreciation.
The domestic real interest rate must also raise because of the PPP condition. When
monetary policy is active (passive), this raise in the domestic real interest rate may take
place if and only if there is an increase (decrease) in the exchange depreciation rate. This
explains why exchange rate dynamics are crucially affected by whether the monetary
policy stance is active or passive.
We then study the implications for the optimal monetary policy design. We demon-
strate that the degree of responsiveness of the nominal interest rate to inflation should be
related to the stock of foreign debt. In particular, we show that it is optimal to imple-
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ment a more passive monetary policy stance in response to larger levels of the outstanding
foreign-currency-denominated debt. The economic intuition for this result goes as follows.
High external indebtedness causes the country-specific risk premium to rise. As a result,
the interest rate on foreign debt increases. According to the international parity condi-
tions, under an active monetary policy stance the domestic nominal interest rate must
also increase in order ensure a higher real interest rate precluding arbitrage opportunities.
Real money balances decrease, thereby lowering welfare. That is why, in this is case, a
fully accommodating monetary policy is needed.
The scheme of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the paper’s contribution to
the literature. Section 3 presents the model and describes the monetary policy regimes.
Section 4 derives the perfect-foresight macroeconomic equilibrium. Section 5 develops the
steady-state analysis. Section 6 studies the stability properties of the setup and examines
the issue of transitional dynamics. Section 7 studies the optimal monetary policy. Section
8 concludes.
2 Related Literature and Model Choice
In this paper we study exchange rate dynamics in a simple optimizing general equilibrium
monetary model of exchange rate determination, with flexible prices and perfect compe-
tition, extended to include a risk premium on domestic assets and a monetary authority
adopting an interest rate rule. The model used in this paper relates to different strands
of literature.
First, it is related to the literature which explores the conditions under which interest-
rate feedback policy rules may generate macroeconomic instability by causing self-fulfilling
inflation expectations. Notably, Taylor’s (1993) prescription that only active interest rate
rules yield a unique stable equilibrium has been questioned by several works. Benhabib,
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2001), in particular, demonstrate that the way in which money
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is assumed to enter preferences and technology may completely reverse the stabilizing
properties of Taylor-type rules. The present paper contributes to this literature by inves-
tigating whether Taylor’s prescriptions are robust with respect to the presence of external
financial frictions.
Second, the paper is related to the literature focussing on monetary policy design
for small open economies and emerging market economies. Most of these contributions
abstract from the presence of financial externalities, assuming that international asset
markets are complete (e.g., Laxton and Pesenti, 2003; Gal´ı and Monacelli, 2005). Never-
theless, De Paoli (2009) shows that the design of optimal monetary policy is significantly
affected by the asset market structure. Devereux, Lane and Xu (2006) study the welfare
ranking of alternative monetary policy rules for emerging market economies when finan-
cial frictions are operative. The present paper contributes to this literature by analyzing
the issue of dynamic stability in the presence of risk premia on external debt, and by
distinguishing between active and passive interest-rate feedback rules.
Finally, the paper is related to the literature on exchange rate determination. In
particular, it presents a simple and natural microfounded extension of the flexible-price
monetary models of the 1970s (e.g. Frenkel, 1976; Mussa, 1976), along the lines of the
basic-one-good monetary model in small open economy of Turnovsky (1997), where the
purchasing power parity holds continuously and money demand and supply are the key
determinants of exchange rates. By allowing for imperfect substitutability between do-
mestic and foreign assets as a consequence of the existence of a country-specific risk
premium, the paper relates somehow to the early literature on the portfolio balance mod-
els of the 1980s (e.g. Frankel, 1983). By explicitly modelling the optimizing behaviour
of consumers and firms in an intertemporal framework, the model relates to the so-called
new-open-economy-macroeconomics started by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). However, in
the traditional literature of exchange rate determination, most results have been derived
under the assumption that the policy instrument used by the central bank is money sup-
5
ply.1 Our model, on the other hand, enables us to examine the implications of financial
externalities on the exchange rate in small open economies under the assumption that
the monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate as an increasing function of the
inflation rate, consistently with a widely documented empirical evidence. In particular,
we distinguish between active and passive interest rate rules in characterizing exchange
rate dynamics. In this respect, our analysis yields additional insights into the question of
exchange rate dynamics.
3 The Model
Consider a small open economy operating in a world of ongoing inflation and flexible
exchange rates. The economy is described by a one-good-monetary model and consists of
four types of agents: consumers, firms, the government and the central bank. All agents
have perfect foresight.
The domestic economy produces and consumes only one tradeable and non-storable
good. Purchasing power parity (PPP) is assumed to hold at all times:
P = P ∗E, (1)
where P (P ∗) is the domestic (foreign) price and E is the nominal exchange rate, defined
as units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency. In percentage terms the PPP
is given by:
π = π∗ + e, (2)
where π (π∗) is the inflation rate of the good in terms of domestic (foreign) currency and
e is the rate of exchange depreciation of domestic currency.
Domestic residents may hold three assets: domestic money, domestic government
1The issue of exchange rate determination under interest-rate feedback rules in the context of a two-
country framework with complete international markets is examined by Benigno and Benigno (2008).
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bonds and foreign assets. Domestic money and government bonds are not held by foreign-
ers. Foreign assets are internationally-traded and are denominated in foreign currency.
However, the home country has not access to a perfect world capital market, but faces an
upward-sloping supply curve of foreign debt, along the lines suggested by Bardhan (1967),
Obstfeld (1982), Bhandari, Haque and Turnovsky (1990), and Turnovsky (1997). From
the standpoint of the borrowing economy, denoting by f the level of real foreign debt and
y domestic output, the nominal interest rate on foreign debt R∗ can then be expressed as
follows:
R∗ = i∗ + σ(f) (3)
where i∗ is the interest rate prevailing in the world market and σ(f) is the country-specific
risk premium. Function σ(·) is continuous, increasing in f and strictly positive.
International capital mobility implies that a risk-adjusted interest parity of the fol-
lowing type holds:
R = R∗ + e, (4)
where R is the nominal rate of interest on bonds issued by the domestic government.
The infinitely-lived representative consumer faces the following lifetime utility func-
tion:
∞∫
0
[U(c, ℓ) + V (m)]e−βtdt, (5)
where β is the rate of time preferences and c, ℓ and m denote consumption, labor and real
money balances, respectively. Functions U(·) and V (·) satisfy the following conditions:
Uc > 0, Uℓ < 0, V
′ > 0, Ucc < 0, Uℓℓ < 0, Ucℓ < 0, and V
′′ < 0.
The flow budget constraint in real terms is:
•
m+
•
b+
•
a = wℓ+ z − τ − c+ (R− π)b+ (R∗ − π∗)a− πm, (6)
where b denotes government bonds, a foreign assets, w the wage rate, z profits, and τ
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lump-sum taxes. Notice that, by definition, a = −f. Throughout the paper, for any
generic variable of the model x,
•
x denotes dx/dt.
The representative agent chooses the optimal plan for c, ℓ, m, b and a in order to
maximize her lifetime utility (5), subject to (6) and given the initial conditions m(0) =
M0
P (0)
, b(0) = B0
P (0)
and a(0) = A0
P ∗
, where M , B and A denote the nominal stocks of money,
government bonds and foreign assets, respectively. Note that consumers take the rate at
which the country can borrow from abroad as given in making their decisions. In other
words, R∗ is intended to be increasing in the aggregate level of foreign debt, which each
consumer assumes she is unable to influence.
The solution to the consumer’s optimization problem yields the following conditions:
Uc(c, ℓ)− µ = 0, (7)
Uℓ(c, ℓ) + wµ = 0, (8)
V ′(m)− µπ = −
•
µ+ µβ, (9)
µ(R− π) = −
•
µ+ µβ, (10)
µ(R∗ − π∗) = −
•
µ+ µβ, (11)
together with the flow budget constraint (6), the initial conditions and the transversality
conditions:
lim
t→∞
µme−βt = lim
t→∞
µbe−βt = lim
t→∞
µae−βt = 0, (12)
where µe−βt is the discounted Lagrange multiplier associated with the wealth accumula-
tion equation (6).
Perfectly competitive firms face a standard neoclassical production function of labor:
y = Λφ(ℓ) (13)
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where y denotes output, φ′(·) > 0, φ′′(·) < 0, and Λ is a positive technology parameter.
Each firm hires labor in order to maximize profits. At the optimum, labor marginal
productivity is equal to the real wage rate Λφ′(ℓ) = w.
The domestic government faces the following flow budget constraint expressed in real
terms:
•
m+
•
b = g − τ + (R− π)b− πm, (14)
where g is government spending. The government is assumed to adopt a tax policy
consisting in balancing the budget at all times:
τ = g + (R− π)b− πm. (15)
The monetary authorities set the nominal interest rate as an increasing function of
the inflation rate, as in Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2001):
R = i+ ρ(π), (16)
where ρ(·) is continuous, non-decreasing, and there exists at least one π > −β such that
i + ρ(π) = β + π; i is a positive parameter capturing exogenous deviations from the
feedback component of the rule. Following Leeper (1991), the interest rate rule (16) is
‘active (‘passive’) if ρ′ > (<)1. In other words, under an active (passive) monetary policy,
the central bank responds to inflation by raising (lowering) the real interest rate.
The dynamic equation describing the accumulation of net foreign assets is given by
the trade balance plus interest payments:
•
a = y − c− g + (R∗ − π∗)a. (17)
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We can rewrite (17) in terms of net foreign debt accumulation as:
•
f = c+ g − y + (R∗ − π∗)f. (18)
4 Macroeconomic Equilibrium
Combining the set of optimality conditions (7)-(11) together with the interest rate on
foreign debt function (3), the international parity conditions (2) and (4), the production
function (13), the monetary policy rule (16), and the foreign debt accumulation equation
(18), the perfect-foresight equilibrium can be described as follows:
•
µ = µβ − (i∗ + σ(f)− π∗)µ, (19)
•
f = c+ g − Λφ(ℓ) + (i∗ + σ(f)− π∗)f, (20)
c = c(µ,Λ), cµ, cΛ < 0, (21)
ℓ = ℓ(µ,Λ), ℓµ, ℓΛ > 0, (22)
m = m(µ) +
ρ′
ρ′ − 1
η (i∗, f, i, π∗) , mµ < 0, ηi∗ , ηf < 0, ηi, ηπ∗ > 0, (23)
e =
1
ρ′ − 1
ǫ (i∗, f, i, π∗) , ǫi∗ , ǫf > 0, ǫi, ǫπ∗ < 0, (24)
where (19) and (20) are the pair of equations describing the evolution of the economy
over time and (21)-(24) describe the equilibrium paths for consumption, work effort, real
money balances and the rate of exchange depreciation of domestic currency, respectively.
See Appendix A for details.
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5 Steady-State Analysis
Under the assumption of perfect foresight, the transitional dynamics of the model de-
pends in part on the expectations of the long-run steady state. This Section derives the
steady-state equilibrium and the long-run effects of changes in both domestic and foreign
exogenous variables.
The steady state of the economy is obtained when the shadow value of wealth is
constant and external debt accumulation ceases, that is when
•
µ =
•
f = 0. From (19)-(24),
the steady state consists of the following set of relationships:
β = i∗ + σ(f)− π∗, (25)
Λφ(ℓ(µ,Λ)) = (i∗ + σ(f)− π∗)f + c(µ,Λ) + g, (26)
c = c(µ,Λ), (27)
ℓ = ℓ(µ,Λ), (28)
y = Λφ(ℓ), (29)
m = m(µ) +
ρ′
ρ′ − 1
η
(
i∗, f , i, π∗
)
, (30)
e =
1
ρ′ − 1
ǫ(i∗, f , i, π∗). (31)
Equations (25)-(31) jointly determine the steady-state equilibrium solutions for µ, f , c,
ℓ, y, m and e as functions of the rate of time preference β, the technology parameter Λ,
public spending g, the monetary policy rule exogenous component i, foreign inflation π∗,
and the interest rate prevailing in the world market i∗.
To study exchange rate dynamics, it is convenient to write down the long-run re-
sponses to changes in exogenous variables of foreign debt and of the rate of depreciation,
respectively. The responses to changes in domestic variables are given by:
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df
di
= 0,
df
dβ
=
1
σ′
> 0,
df
dΛ
=
df
dg
= 0, (32)
de
di
= −
1
ρ′ − 1
< (>)0,
de
dβ
=
1
ρ′ − 1
> (<)1 if ρ > (<)1 and
de
dΛ
=
de
dg
= 0. (33)
On the other hand, the responses to changes in the foreign variables are given by:
df
dπ∗
=
1
σ′
> 0,
df
di∗
= −
1
σ′
> 0, (34)
de
dπ∗
= −1,
de
di∗
= 0. (35)
The long-run responses of all endogenous variables of the economy to changes in the
exogenous variables of both domestic and foreign origin are reported in Tables 1 and 2,
respectively, where ∆ ≡ −σ′ (cµ(µ,Λ)− Λφ
′ℓµ(µ,Λ)) > 0. Full derivations are developed
in Appendix B.
6 Transitional Dynamics
Linearizing the differential equations (19)-(20) around the steady-state equilibrium
{
µ, f
}
yields: 

•
f
•
µ

 =

 β + σ
′f cµ(µ,Λ)− Λφ
′ℓµ(µ,Λ)
−σ′µ 0



 f − f
µ− µ

 . (36)
The above system displays one predetermined variable, f , and one jumping variable, µ.
In order to have a unique perfect-foresight equilibrium in the neighborhood of the steady
state (i.e. saddle-path stability), the Jacobian of the system must have eigenvalues of
opposite sign. This property is satisfied by the system (36), since the determinant of the
Jacobian, given by σ′µ [cµ(µ,Λ)− Λφ
′ℓµ(µ,Λ)], is negative. The Taylor principle, ρ
′ > 1,
is not necessary to bring about equilibrium determinacy. Intuitively, this is because the
time path of inflation depends not only on the central bank’s behavior, but also on the
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time path of external debt and the international parity conditions. Whether monetary
policy is active or passive is immaterial for determinacy.
Focusing now on the stable path, the solutions for f and e are given by:
f = f +
(
f0 − f
)
eλt, (37)
e = e+
1
ρ′ − 1
ǫf
(
f − f
)
, (38)
where λ < 0 is the stable eigenvalue and f0 is the initial condition on foreign debt (see
Appendix C for full derivations). Using the steady-state multipliers given by (32)-(35),
the impact effects on the rate of depreciation of changes in domestic and foreign variables
are, respectively:
de (0)+
di
= −
1
ρ′ − 1
< (>)0 if ρ > (<)1,
de (0)+
dβ
=
de (0)+
dΛ
=
de (0)+
dg
= 0, (39)
de (0)+
dπ∗
= −
ρ′
ρ′ − 1
< (>)0,
de (0)+
di∗
=
1
ρ′ − 1
> (<)0 if ρ > (<)1. (40)
The impact effects on all endogenous variables of changes in domestic and foreign variables
are summarized in Tables 3 and 4 (see Appendix D for details).
From the analysis of both the steady-state equilibrium and the transitional dynamics,
it emerges that the dynamic behavior of the nominal exchange rate critically depends upon
whether the monetary-policy reaction coefficient ρ′ is above or below unity. Examining
(38), in fact, the exchange depreciation rate is correlated with foreign debt, along the
transitional path towards the steady-state equilibrium, with a coefficient, ǫf/ (ρ
′ − 1),
which is greater (lower) than zero if ρ′ > (<) 1. An intuitive explanation is the following.
A change in external indebtedness alters the international parity conditions given by
the risk-adjusted interest rate parity, thereby influencing exchange rate dynamics. In
particular, an increase in foreign debt causes the country-specific risk premium to raise,
leading to an increase in the nominal interest rate faced by the small open economy. This
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brings about an increase in the domestic nominal interest rate net of domestic currency
depreciation, according to the risk-adjusted interest rate parity condition. Recalling the
PPP condition, it also follows that the domestic real interest rate has to raise. The key
point is that when monetary policy is active (passive), an increase in the domestic real
interest rate may occur if and only if there is an increase (decrease) in the exchange
depreciation rate. Exchange rate dynamics are thus qualitatively affected by whether the
interest rate rule is active or passive.
Figures 1 and 2 plot the time path of the nominal exchange depreciation rate in re-
sponse to changes in i, β, π∗ and i∗ under active and passive monetary policy, respectively.
Figure 1a shows that the rate of exchange depreciation instantaneously declines in
response to an increase in i. In this case there is no transitional dynamics, since in the
steady state a change in the nominal interest rate does not affect foreign indebtedness. The
exchange rate jumps instantaneously to the new steady state. Intuitively, an exogenous
rise in i must crowd out the endogenous component of the domestic real interest rate
(ρ(π) − π), in order to restore both the risk-adjusted interest rate parity and the PPP.
Since monetary policy overreacts to inflation, the endogenous component of the domestic
real interest rate decreases only when the rate of exchange depreciation decreases.
On the other hand, an increase in the rate of time preference β increases the level
of indebtedness and hence the cost of external borrowing. In this case, the combination
of the active Taylor rule with the risk-corrected interest parity and the PPP implies an
increase in the depreciation rate of the domestic currency. The exchange rate, in fact,
starts to increase converging gradually to its long-run equilibrium (see Figure 1b).
An increase in foreign inflation π∗ causes external indebtedness to raise and the rate
of exchange depreciation to fall in the long run, as it emerges from equations (34) and
(35). Under an active monetary policy, a rise in foreign inflation implies a reduction on
impact of the domestic currency depreciation rate, which overshoots its long-run value
(see Figure 1c). After the initial downward jump, in fact, e starts to increase, approaching
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asymptotically a new steady-state below its original level.
Figure 1d shows that an increase in the world interest rate i∗ determines an upward
jump of the rate of exchange depreciation on impact, since foreign bonds become more
attractive. This implies a decline in the steady-state foreign debt, as it emerges from
(34). As long as the monetary authorities are engaged in an active interest rate policy,
the reduction in the level of external debt over time must be associated with a decline in
e, along the adjustment path towards the new steady-state equilibrium. This can occur
if only if there is an instantaneous upward jump in e.
From Figures 2a-2d, one can see how the responses of the nominal exchange rate
obtained under an interest rate rule satisfying the Taylor principle are reversed in the
case of an accommodating monetary policy, underreacting to inflation. A passive Taylor
rule requires a decline in the exchange depreciation rate each time that a domestic real
interest rate increase is necessary to restore the equilibrium due, for example, to increases
in β or i∗ (see Figures 2b and 2d). On the other hand, an increase in i requires a reduction
in the endogenous component of the domestic real rate implying, under a passive rule, a
higher depreciation rate (see Figure 2a). An increase in foreign inflation requires a long-
run fall in the rate of exchange depreciation, although it brings about an upward jump of
e on impact (see Figure 2c). In this case, only the short-run response crucially depends
on the monetary policy regime, while the effects of the PPP prevail in the long run.
7 Optimal Monetary Policy
We now derive the implications for the optimal design of interest rate policies. The op-
timizing problem for the central bank is to choose the monetary-policy responsiveness to
inflation, i.e., ρ′, in order to maximize the representative consumer’s lifetime utility func-
tion (5) given the following perfect-foresight equilibrium solutions describing the perfectly
competitve behaviour of the economy in the neighborhood of the steady state (c, ℓ, m,
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f) (see Appendix C):
c = c−
cµσ
′µ
λ
(
f0 − f
)
eλt, (41)
ℓ = ℓ−
ℓµσ
′µ
λ
(
f0 − f
)
eλt, (42)
m = m+
(
ρ′ηf
ρ′ − 1
−
mµσ
′µ
λ
)(
f0 − f
)
eλt. (43)
Consistently with Friedman (1969), let us suppose that the function V (•) is strictly
increasing in real money balances as long as m < ms, but not increasing for m > ms,
where ms > m¯ represents a finite level of real money balances at which consumers are
satisfied with liquidity.2 Specifically, let us assume a sufficiently high satiation level ms,
such that ms > m¯+
(
ηf −
mµσ
′µ
λ
) (
f0 − f
)
eλt. Optimality must imply that
ρ′ = 0 if f0 > f, (44)
1 < ρ′ <
1
1− 1
ms−m
ηf (f0−f)eλt
+
mµσ′µ
ηfλ
if f0 < f. (45)
According to (44) and (45), the optimal degree of reactiveness of the nominal interest rate
to inflation critically depends on the level foreign debt. In particular, if the outstanding
foreign debt is above its steady-state target level, i.e., f0 > f , it is optimal to adopt a
fully accommodating monetary policy, ρ′ = 0. By contrast, if the outstanding foreign
debt is below its steady-state target level, i.e., f0 < f , it is optimal to adopt an aggressive
monetary policy, satisfying the Taylor principle ρ′ > 1.
The economic interpretation for these findings goes as follows. Consider first the case
in which f0 > f . According to equation (38), if the monetary authority uses a feedback
policy rule satisfying the Taylor principle, ρ′ > 1, the exchange depreciation rate must be
higher than its steady-state level. According to the PPP condition, the inflation rate must
also be higher than its steady-state level. Hence the Taylor rule prescribes an increase
2For a discussion about the existence of a satiation point for real balances, see, e.g., McCallum (1990)
and Woodford (1990).
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in the nominal interest rate, which lowers real money balances and so welfare. Monetary
policy should thus be fully passive in order to avoid a crowding out effect on real balances.
Note that this is result is robust to changes in the degree of elasticity of the upward-sloping
schedule of foreign debt, measured by the parameter σ′.3
Next, consider the case in which f0 < f . According to equation (38), under an active
monetary policy stance, the exchange depreciation rate, the inflation rate and the domestic
nominal interest rate are now lower than their steady-state levels. As a result, real money
balances and so welfare increase. Note that in this case, an increase in the elasticity of the
schedule of foreign debt requires a less active monetary policy stance. This is because the
higher σ′, i.e., the more elastic the schedule of foreign debt, the higher ηf , i.e., the higher
the negative sensitivity of real balances to the difference f − f0 through the international
parity conditions, the lower the optimal value of ρ′, i.e., the less aggressive interest rate
policies must be.
8 Concluding Remarks
External indebtedness poses constraints on the borrowing opportunities of emerging mar-
ket and developing economies, as empirically evidenced. We have analyzed the dynamic
effects of interest rate rules in the spirit of Taylor (1993, 1999) in an optimizing model of
exchange rate determination that incorporates a risk premium on foreign debt.
An imperfect global capital market has strong implications for the design of monetary
policy rules in emerging market economies that do not choose to adopt a ‘hard’ peg
exchange rate regime. In particular, it is demonstrated that when external borrowing
is subject to credit risk, the usual requirement that the monetary authorities should
fight inflation aggressively by raising the nominal interest rate more than proportionally
with respect to increases in inflation is not necessary to ensure equilibrium stability and
3An increase in the elasticity of the schedule of foreign debt can be interpreted as an increase in the
degree of risk aversion in the rest of the world, which generates a “flight to quality” in investment, thereby
reducing the willingness to invest in the domestic economy.
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uniqueness. Under a passive monetary policy, a rise in inflation causes an increase in
private consumption, which tends to stimulate foreign borrowing. If the schedule of
external debt is upward sloping, the accumulation of foreign debt will lead to an increase
in the risk premium, which in turn will tend to reduce aggregate demand and inflation.
Thus, in the presence of external financial frictions, a non-aggressive monetary policy does
not necessarily lead to self-fulfilling inflation expectations.
On the other hand, our analytical findings show that the dynamics of exchange rates,
when the central bank implements interest rate policies, are critically affected by whether
monetary policy overreacts or underreacts to inflation. A worsening in external indebt-
edness generates an increase in the country-specific risk premium, thereby causing an
increase in the nominal interest rate faced by the small open economy. Because of the
risk-adjusted interest rate parity condition, there must be an increase in the domestic
nominal interest rate net of domestic currency depreciation. Because of the PPP condi-
tion, there must also be an increase in the domestic real interest rate. The central point
is that under an active (passive) monetary policy stance, an increase in the domestic real
interest rate does occur if and only the exchange depreciation rate increases (decreases).
Exchange rate dynamics are therefore influenced by whether the interest-rate feedback
policy rule is active or passive. In this respect, the present paper adds interesting insights
to the classical theoretical debate on exchange rate determination.
The issue of optimal monetary policy is also investigated. Should central banks in
emerging market economies take into account external indebtedness in the design of
optimal monetary rules? Should interest-rate feedback rules active or passive? Our anal-
ysis proves that the monetary-policy feedback parameter in response to an increase in
the inflation rate should crucially depend upon the outstanding level of foreign debt. In
particular, we find that it is optimal to adopt a more passive interest rate policy the
higher stock of debt denominated in foreign currency. These results cast doubts on the
conventional view that the only sound optimal monetary policy is the one based on an
18
interest rate rule reacting aggressively to inflation pressures.
Of course, the analysis presented in this paper is based on a number of simplifying
assumptions necessary to yield a framework by which to study the influence of external
financial frictions on monetary policy design in a quite straightforward way. Nevertheless,
at least two possible extensions are worth to be mentioned.
First, the assumption of flexible prices is primarily made for expositional simplicity.
Under sticky prices, the implied sluggish adjustment of both nominal and real variables
in response to monetary disturbances does not affect the character of our analysis in any
essential way. Second, an upward-sloping schedule of foreign debt could be derived from
explicit microfoundations. Incorporating this feature within a dynamic general equilib-
rium model is a very challenging issue. A formal analysis is beyond the scope of the
present paper. Investigation of these issues is left to future research.
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Appendix A
Consumption and labor supply can be expressed as function of µ and Λ as follows. Totally
differentiate (7) and (8), given Λφ′(ℓ) = w, and write the results in matrix notation:

 Ucc Ucℓ
Uℓc Uℓℓ + Λφ
′′µ



 dc
dℓ

 =

 1 0
−Λφ′ −φ′µ



 dµ
dΛ

 . (A1)
Let Ψ ≡ Ucc (Uℓℓ + Λφ
′′µ)− U2cℓ > 0. We obtain the following results:
cµ =
dc
dµ
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 Ucℓ
−Λφ′ Uℓℓ + Λφ
′′µ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Ψ
=
Uℓℓ + Λφ
′′µ+ UcℓΛφ
′
Ψ
< 0, (A2)
cΛ =
dc
dΛ
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 Ucℓ
−φ′µ Uℓℓ + Λφ
′′µ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Ψ
=
Ucℓφ
′µ
Ψ
< 0, (A3)
ℓµ =
dℓ
dµ
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Ucc 1
Uℓc −Λφ
′
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Ψ
= −
UccΛφ
′ + Uℓc
Ψ
> 0, (A4)
ℓΛ =
dℓ
dΛ
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Ucc 0
Uℓc −φ
′µ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Ψ
= −
Uccφ
′µ
Ψ
> 0. (A5)
Consider now the derivation of the exchange rate determination function (24). By
combining equations (2)-(4) with the Taylor rule (16), we obtain:
i∗ + σ(f) + e = i+ ρ(π∗ + e). (A6)
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Totally differentiating the above expression gives:
de (ρ′ − 1) = di∗ + σ′df − di+ ρ′dπ∗. (A7)
Letting de
di∗
(ρ′ − 1) = ǫi∗ = 1,
de
df
(ρ′ − 1) = ǫf = σ
′, de
di
(ρ′ − 1) = ǫi = −1 and
de
dpi∗
(ρ′ − 1) =
ǫπ∗ = −ρ
′, equation (24) immediately follows.
Finally, the equation describing the time path of real money balances can be obtained
by combining (9) with the Taylor rule (16):
V ′(m) = µ (i+ ρ(π∗ + e)) . (A8)
Totally differentiating yields:
V ′′dm = Rdµ+ µ (di+ ρ′dπ∗ + ρ′de) , (A9)
which, given (A7), can be re-written as:
dm =
R
V ′′
dµ+
1
ρ′ − 1
ρ′σ′df − di− ρ′dπ∗ + ρ′di∗
V ′′
µ. (A10)
Letting dm
dµ
= mµ =
R
V ′′
, dm
di∗
ρ′−1
ρ′
= ηi∗ =
µ
V ′′
, dm
df
ρ′−1
ρ′
= ηf =
σ′µ
V ′′
, dm
di
ρ′−1
ρ′
= ηi = −
µ
ρ′V ′′
and
dm
dpi∗
ρ′−1
ρ′
= ηπ∗ = −
µ
V ′′
, equation (23) immediately follows.
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Appendix B
Totally differentiate (25) and (26) and express the results in matrix notation:

 0 σ
′
cµ(µ,Λ)− Λφ
′ℓµ(µ,Λ) β



 dµ
df

 =

 1 0 0 1 −1
−f κ −1 0 0




dβ
dΛ
dg
dπ∗
di∗


,
where κ ≡ φ(ℓ(µ,Λ)) + Λφ′ℓΛ(µ,Λ)− cΛ(µ,Λ) > 0.
Letting ∆ ≡ −σ′ (cµ(µ,Λ)− Λφ
′ℓµ(µ,Λ)) > 0 we obtain the following set of deriva-
tives:
dµ
dβ
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
−f
σ′
β
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∆
=
β + σ′f
∆
> 0, (B1)
dµ
dΛ
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0
κ
σ′
−β
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∆
= −
κσ′
∆
< 0, (B2)
dµ
dg
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0
−1
σ′
β
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∆
=
σ′
∆
> 0, (B3)
dµ
dπ∗
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
0
σ′
β
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∆
=
β
∆
> 0, (B4)
dµ
di∗
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−1
0
σ′
β
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∆
= −
β
∆
< 0, (B5)
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df
dβ
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0
[cµ(µ,Λ)− Λφ
′ℓµ(µ,Λ)]
1
−f
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∆
= −
cµ(µ,Λ)− Λφ
′ℓµ(µ,Λ)
∆
=
1
σ′
> 0, (B6)
df
dΛ
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0
cµ(µ,Λ)− Λφ
′ℓµ(µ,Λ)
0
κ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∆
= 0, (B7)
df
dg
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0
cµ(µ,Λ)− Λφ
′ℓµ(µ,Λ)
0
−1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∆
= 0, (B8)
df
dπ∗
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0
cµ(µ,Λ)− Λφ
′ℓµ(µ,Λ)
1
0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∆
= −
cµ(µ,Λ)− Λφ
′ℓµ(µ,Λ)
∆
=
1
σ′
> 0, (B9)
df
di∗
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0
cµ(µ,Λ)− Λφ
′ℓµ(µ,Λ)
−1
0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∆
=
cµ(µ,Λ)− Λφ
′ℓµ(µ,Λ)
∆
= −
1
σ′
< 0. (B10)
Given the above results and using (21)-(24), one obtains the long-run effects on consump-
tion, labor inputs, income, real money balances and exchange rates. This shows results
reported in Tables 1 and 2.
Appendix C
Focusing on the stable path, the solutions for µ, f , c, ℓ, y, m and e are of the following
form:
µ = µ−
σ′µ
λ
(
f0 − f
)
eλt, (C1)
f = f +
(
f0 − f
)
eλt, (C2)
c = c+ cµ(µ− µ), (C3)
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ℓ = ℓ+ ℓµ(µ− µ), (C4)
y = y + φ′ℓµ(µ− µ), (C5)
m = m+mµ(µ− µ) +
ρ′
ρ′ − 1
ηf
(
f − f
)
, (C6)
e = e+
1
ρ′ − 1
ǫf
(
f − f
)
, (C7)
where λ < 0 is the stable eigenvalue and f0 is the initial condition on foreign debt.
Appendix D
At time t = 0, differentiating (C1)-(C7) with respect to some arbitrary variable, say x,
yields:
dµ (0)+
dx
=
dµ
dx
+
σ′µ
λ
df
dx
, (D1)
df (0)+
dx
= 0, (D2)
dc (0)+
dx
=
dc
dx
+ cµ
(
dµ (0)
dx
−
dµ
dx
)
, (D3)
dℓ (0)+
dx
=
dℓ
dx
+ ℓµ
(
dµ (0)
dx
−
dµ
dx
)
, (D4)
dy (0)+
dx
=
dy
dx
+ φ′ℓµ
(
dµ (0)
dx
−
dµ
dx
)
, (D5)
dm (0)+
dx
=
dm
dx
+mµ
(
dµ (0)
dx
−
dµ
dx
)
−
ρ′
ρ′ − 1
ηf
df
dx
, (D6)
de (0)+
dx
=
de
dx
−
σ′
ρ′ − 1
df
dx
. (D7)
From the above relationships for x = i, β,Λ, g, i, π∗, using the results reported in Tables
1 and 2, one can easily obtain the impact effects of Tables 3 and 4.
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Table 1: Steady-State Effects of Changes in Domestic Variables and Parameters
i β Λ g
µ 0 β+σ
′f
∆
> 0 −
[φ(ℓ)+Λφ′ℓΛ−cΛ]σ′
∆
< 0 σ
′
∆
> 0
f 0 1
σ′
> 0 0 0
c 0 cµ
β+σ′f
∆
< 0 cΛ −
[φ(ℓ)+Λφ′ℓΛ−cΛ]σ′cµ
∆
> 0 σ
′cµ
∆
< 0
ℓ 0 ℓµ
β+σ′f
∆
> 0 ℓΛ −
[φ(ℓ)+Λφ′ℓΛ−cΛ]σ′ℓµ
∆
⋚ 0 σ′ℓµ
∆
> 0
y 0 φ′ℓµ
β+σ′f
∆
> 0 φ′ℓΛ −
[φ(ℓ)+Λφ′ℓΛ−cΛ]σ′φ′ℓµ
∆
⋚ 0 σ′φ
′ℓµ
∆
> 0
m − µ
V ′′
1
ρ′−1
≷ 0 R
V ′′
β+σ′f
∆
+ µ
V ′′(ρ′−1)
ρ′ ≶ 0 − [φ(ℓ)+Λφ
′ℓΛ−cΛ]σ′
∆
R
V ′′
> 0 σ
′
∆
R
V ′′
< 0
e − 1
ρ′−1
≶ 0 1
ρ′−1
≷ 0 0 0
Table 2: Steady-State Effects of Changes in Foreign Variables
π∗ i∗
µ β
∆
> 0 − β
∆
< 0
f 1
σ′
> 0 − 1
σ′
< 0
c −cµ
β
∆
< 0 cµ
β
∆
> 0
ℓ −ℓµ
β
∆
> 0 ℓµ
β
∆
< 0
y −φ′ℓµ
β
∆
> 0 φ′ℓµ
β
∆
< 0
m R
V ′′
β
∆
< 0 − R
V ′′
β
∆
> 0
e −1 0
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Table 3: Impact Effects of Changes in Domestic Variables and Parameters
i β Λ g
µ (0)+ 0 dµ
dβ
− µ
λ1
> 0 dµ
dΛ
< 0 dµ
dg
> 0
c (0)+ 0 dc
dβ
− cµ
µ
λ1
< 0 dc
dΛ
T 0 dc
dg
< 0
ℓ (0)+ 0 dℓ
dβ
− µ
λ1
ℓµ > 0
dℓ
dΛ
S 0 dℓ
dg
> 0
y (0)+ 0 dy
dβ
− µ
λ1
φ′ℓµ > 0
dy
dΛ
S 0 dy
dg
> 0
m (0)+ − µ
V ′′
1
ρ′−1
≷ 0 R
V ′′
β+σ′f
∆
− R
V ′′
µ
λ1
< 0 −
[φ(ℓ)+φ′ℓΛ−cΛ]σ′
∆
R
V ′′
> 0 σ
′
∆
R
V ′′
< 0
e (0)+ − 1
ρ′−1
≶ 0 0 0 0
Table 4: Impact Effects of Changes in Foreign Variables
π∗ i∗
µ (0)+ dµ
dπ∗
− µ
λ1
> 0 dµ
di∗
+ µ
λ1
< 0
c (0)+ dc
dπ∗
− cµ
µ
λ1
< 0 dc
di∗
+ cµ
µ
λ1
> 0
ℓ (0)+ dℓ
dπ∗
− ℓµ
µ
λ1
> 0 dℓ
di∗
+ ℓµ
µ
λ1
< 0
y (0)+ dy
dπ∗
− φ′ℓµ
µ
λ1
> 0 dy
di∗
+ φ′ℓµ
µ
λ1
< 0
m (0)+ 1
V ′′
(
βR
∆
− Rµ
λ1
− ρ
′µ
ρ′−1
)
≷ 0 1
V ′′
(
−βR
∆
+ Rµ
λ1
+ ρ
′µ
ρ′−1
)
≶ 0
e (0)+ − 1
ρ′−1
ρ′ ≶ 0 1
ρ′−1
≷ 0
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Figure 1: Exchange Rate Dynamics under Active Monetary Policy, ρ′ > 1
Figure 1a: Response to an Increase in i Figure 1b: Response to an Increase in β
e(0)
0
t
e(0)
0
t
Figure 1c: Response to an Increase in pi∗ Figure 1d: Response to an Increase in i∗
e(0)
0
t
e(0)
0
t
29
Figure 2: Exchange Rate Dynamics under Passive Monetary Policy, ρ′ < 1
Figure 2a: Response to an Increase in i Figure 2b: Response to an Increase in β
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